



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 1

Would Commonwealth Solve Algerian Problem?

by Mario Rossi

The Muslim rebellion in Algeria will soon enter its fourth year and there is no indication yet whether the French premier, General Charles de Gaulle, will be in a position to end it. The prospects of peace seem more favorable than in the past, but many unknowns stand in the way. Very wisely, General de Gaulle has not made his plans known and is not expected to do so until he feels that he is ready to act.

In a speech delivered on Bastille Day, July 14, the premier vaguely discussed a plan for establishing federal ties between France and its overseas territories, with a special place reserved for Algeria. This plan requires in turn a revision of the French constitution, since a federal system presupposes a strong executive. It is unlikely, therefore, that France will be in a position to deal decisively with the Algerian question before a new constitution has been adopted by popular referendum to be held on September 28 and the Fifth Republic comes into being.

But even if the executive in Paris acquires new strength and stability, the difficulties that remain to be surmounted are staggering. The main obstacles are probably of a psychological nature. Most moderates in France and Algeria

agree that the North African country will need to be closely tied to France without at the same time being considered French. A long and bloody war has shown that many Algerians want a country they can call their own. At the same time, the more responsible Algerian nationalist leaders realize that without continued French assistance Algeria would rapidly sink to the level of the most backward Middle Eastern countries.

In her brilliant book, *Algeria: The Realities* (Knopf, 1958), the noted French sociologist, Germaine Tillion, has shown that Algeria is halfway across the ford that divides pauperization from progress. To complete the crossing to the bank of progress, she explains, Algeria needs massive assistance that no other country but France is willing and ready to offer. To reach this goal, and at the same time satisfy the national aspirations of the young Muslim generation, the French should renounce the idea that "Algeria is France," and the Muslim nationalists should renounce their battle cry about "independent Algeria."

This is where the psychological difficulties come in. To achieve a constructive settlement France needs a government which is not only

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strong, but which is also obeyed. The French settlers and the army in Algeria rebelled against the Fourth Republic and provoked its fall. Will they obey the Fifth Republic if it proposes a solution which does not conform with the thesis that "Algeria is France"? The settlers could not put up decisive resistance against a government that is popular in France and ready to act. The key factor, therefore, is the army. But the role of the army in Algeria, despite all that has been written and said about it, is difficult to evaluate. Some observers believe that the military demand no more than a solution that will preserve the honor of their flag. The French army, they say, does not want to leave Algeria defeated, the way it left Indochina. Other observers hold to the belief, which is difficult to defend, that the army, being as reactionary an element in Algeria as it is in France, will oppose any liberal settlement.

Role of Army

It is indeed difficult to believe that politics is at the heart of the army's attitude, despite its sentimental attachment to past traditions. For one thing, army leaders appear to realize that the Muslim nationalists are fighting a struggle which is not only "patriotic" but also "revolutionary," in that it aims not only to free the country of foreign rule, but also to transform the economic and social order in Algeria. The army has adapted itself to this circumstance, not only by promoting innovations of its own, but by adopting the methods

of modern psychological warfare. Officers training for service in Algeria are required to study books by Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-minh, Marshal Tito, Lenin and other modern revolutionary leaders.

In the final analysis the attitude of the army will be determined by the degree of popular support Paris will obtain in an effort to find a reasonable solution. The issue, therefore, will be decided in France far more than in Algeria. The mood of the French public is at this moment very difficult to assess, but there seems to be an increasing realization that a military decision in Algeria is impossible and that a political solution must be sought. Such a solution implies negotiations which, in turn, imply a readiness to compromise. The Roman Catholic hierarchy in France has urged a solution that takes account of Muslim national aspirations, and it has repeatedly urged an end to the conflict; but its influence on political issues is limited. The press is becoming more liberal on the Algerian question, and many newspapers are now joining the once lonely fight of dailies like *Le Monde* and magazines like *L'Express* in advocating a compromise. The best solution for Algeria, which persons close to de Gaulle attribute to the general, would be the establishment of a commonwealth similar to that created by Britain, one which, despite differences of traditions and outlook, has made it possible for such countries as India and Ghana to maintain close links with Britain.

Some observers have suggested

that what France really wants now is not so much to preserve her empire as to make sure that no one else will take over whenever and wherever she leaves. Another vital consideration is oil, in which the Sahara desert is reported to be rich. The recent oil deal between the former French protectorate of Morocco and Italy must have brought home to Paris the realization that unless the full equality of territories under the French sphere of influence is recognized, there is little hope that the old ties can be maintained.

French Offer

The French Government has made it clear that those territories which vote against the draft constitution in the referendum will be treated as having seceded and considered independent. It would be difficult indeed for France to recognize for all territories but Algeria the right of independence—all the more so since Algerians are likely to accept a commonwealth status. And this relationship could also be extended to Tunisia and Morocco. This would satisfy the Algerians' demand for independence, even if within the framework of interdependence with France. But would this solution be accepted by public opinion in France? This at the moment is the big question; and no one can be sure that even General de Gaulle will succeed in making it palatable.

Writer and lecturer, Mr. Rossi for the past five years has reported for *The Christian Science Monitor* on Middle Eastern, South-east Asian and North African events as reflected at the United Nations.

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Will an East-West *Détente* Emerge?

The really important fact about the international scene today is that a new element of fluidity has been injected into great-power relationships.

In the Middle East, every sign points toward a *détente*, or general easing of tension. For what it is worth, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic has promised to abandon the violent methods he has been using to build an empire, and has agreed to let the United Nations stand guard over fulfillment of that promise.

In the diplomacy of disarmament, East and West have agreed on the technique of enforcing a nuclear test ban and have thus laid the foundations for a first step toward control of the atomic arms race.

Within the Communist world, Russia has offered to support deviationist Yugoslavia for the presidency of the UN General Assembly—a lost cause, but a sign that months of extreme hostility may be reversed. Red China is showing more and more independence of Moscow.

Where all this is leading is not immediately clear. Few UN diplomats are hailing the birth of a brave, new world. But many believe the opportunities for genuine peacemaking are better now than they have been in a very long time.

It would surprise no one if, in the not-too-distant future, renewed and intensified preparations were to be undertaken for a summit conference—one sufficiently well prepared for the West to welcome, and one out of which useful action could come.

Indeed, some spadework toward that end has already been done behind the scenes at the current UN General Assembly.

It is possible to discern, in all this, the first hints of a logical pattern.

It is as if Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, dismayed at the Frankenstein monster he confronted when he went to Peiping, had begun to wonder if it might not be well to seek friends elsewhere—or at least, to lay the groundwork for so doing if the need one day were to become acute.

Whether this is indeed the emerging pattern of world events or not, the hard fact is that diplomacy of a high order has produced a marked change in outlook for the Middle East, and produced it with startling suddenness.

Mideast *Détente*

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld will not have a UN peace force to work with; that idea is temporarily on ice. But the function of a peace force—erecting a kind of moral plate-glass window—can be performed almost as well, in some circumstances, by a small, unarmed team of observers and/or a high-powered UN commissioner; and this sort of thing is now (due to a policy reversal by Jordan) acceptable on all sides.

Moreover—and this is perhaps the most encouraging aspect of all—there are indications that, under the cover of handling purely Arab problems, Hammarskjöld may be able to do some quiet Arab-Israel peacemaking as well.

Little can be said about this at the present stage. Premature publicity would destroy the opportunity. But the very fact that the opportunity exists is highly important. There is quiet hopefulness in UN corridors and lounges when the subject of

Israel is mentioned. Nor is this an accident; the atmosphere has been sedulously cultivated.

One reason for the hopefulness is that as a result of the coup in Iraq, Cairo and Baghdad no longer need to compete in hostility to Israel in order to prove they are true Arabs.

Removal of this Cairo-Baghdad rivalry goes far to explain President Nasser's sudden change of tactics and perhaps of policy. Nasser 'need' no longer fight for his position in the Arab world; he has no real rival—and there is no prospect of one arising, least of all in Lebanon and Jordan. The tide is running his way.

This alone, however, does not explain his promise to abandon the method of indirect aggression. The rest of the explanation is that his violent tactics seemed likely to cease paying off. His foreign minister ran into a stone wall of plain-speaking opposition behind the scenes here from the Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, and even Liberia and Ethiopia, as well as from Lebanon and Jordan. Much of the Islamic world demanded that Nasser stop playing pyromaniac, and he agreed.

The voice of the new Iraqi government is reported to be moderate and reasonable behind the scenes. It is ironic that much of the Mideast crisis should have been provoked by fears arising out of precisely the governmental change which has done much to facilitate a *détente*. But out of just such ironies, history is made.

WILLIAM R. FRYE

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years. He is the author of *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York, Oceana Publications for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957).



Does U.S. Foreign Policy Meet Today's Problems?

Views of John Foster Dulles

The following is excerpted from *The Challenge of Change* (The Department of State, June 6, 1958), which is the text of a statement made by the Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 6.

WE face the challenge of change. Long-established political relationships are evaporating; massive fresh human aspirations demand new responses; physical limitations within and without this globe are being swept away by the advances of science.

1. We are witnessing a political revolution that is drastic and world-wide in its repercussions. For 500 years Europe was predominant in the world through a political system known as colonialism, backed by preponderant industrial and military power.

That political system is now in process of rapid transformation. . . .

But stability is not achieved and a new order comfortably established merely by the grant of political independence. That is but the beginning of a two-phased struggle.

To preserve political independence requires a people who themselves exercise self-restraint and who acquire education. Without these qualities, political independence may mean but a brief transition from benevolent colonialism to ruthless dictatorship.

The second front is the economic front. The grant of independence has generated mass aspirations, which have spread contagiously to all who, having been bogged down for centuries in a morass of abject poverty, demand a prospect for rising in the economic scale.

Thus, we face a world new both in terms of its political structure and its economic demands.

2. We face another new world in terms of physical power. The splitting of the atom revealed sources of

power so vast, so omnipresent, as to imply a new industrial revolution. Also it changes the very nature of war, in that general war now would menace the very existence of human life upon this planet.

3. A third new world opens in terms of outer space. Throughout history, until now, man has assumed that the atmosphere put a limit on man's reach. Now his satellites and missiles go far beyond. Soon they will be carrying human beings far beyond. Just what this means we do not know. We sense but dimly what we realize must be new possibilities of infinite purport.

4. Even on this globe, old areas take on new aspects. What were barriers of forbidding cold and ice now, in the north, offer the routes whereby many can most quickly establish contact with each other. And in the south, Antarctica, probed by the Geophysical Year, reveals a new and exciting possibility of service to mankind.

5. And peace must be better assured within the society of nations.

Today no international wars are being fought. For that we can be thankful. But our peace is a precarious peace, because it depends too much on individual and national restraints, upon accurate calculations, and upon avoidance of miscalculations and mischances. It is not sufficiently rooted in a system of law, order and justice.

Unless we build a better international order, all of the new prospects which beckon mankind forward and upward will come to the naught of a blackout that has no ending. . . .

The United States responds to the challenge of change. As an equal among equals, and in willing partnership with others, we play a positive and creative part. We do so not merely as a counter to Communist imperialism. We do so because to play such a part is natural to us and comports with our great tradition. We do so in no partisan mood, but with policies that reflect solid bipartisan cooperation.

Our Responses

1. *The Independence Movement.* . . . We realize full well that the solid establishment of independence is a hard task. We take every appropriate occasion to assist it. . . .

2. *Atoms for Peace.* The United States pioneers in the world of the atom. Our first concern is that this incredibly great force shall not be used for human destruction. . . .

President Eisenhower expressed, in 1953, to the United Nations our determination "to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

We are doing much to assure that the new world of power which is developing will, in fact, serve that noble purpose. . . .

6. *Economic Well-Being.* We see that the world of today requires better economic health than was tolerable in past times. . . .

7. *Public Law 480.* Our great agricultural productivity now serves the humanitarian needs of a changing world. The time was when starvation was chronic in many densely populated areas.

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Views of J. W. Fulbright

The following is excerpted from the speech of Senator Fulbright (Democrat of Arkansas) before the Senate on June 20, 1958 and published in the *Congressional Record* of that date.

THE unfortunate fact is that our policies in recent years have been neither flexible nor astute. Repeatedly, the Russians have made inroads into the non-Communist world by their astuteness, their alertness, and their willingness to change methods. We forget . . . that Russian policy is not only what happened in Hungary. If it were only a question of a policy of military oppression, we would have, in my opinion, a much more easily defeated adversary. But Russian policy is also the military withdrawal from Finland; it is the Soviet signature of the Austrian peace treaty, and subsequent military withdrawal from that country; it is also Russian acquiescence in the recent modifications in Polish communism; it is political support of the non-Communist nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, and economic aid to the countries of these regions. It is, most of all, an almost continuous propaganda refrain which calls for action to reduce the danger of nuclear warfare, coupled with proposals for a great variety of approaches to this fundamental international problem.

It is not enough to dismiss these actions simply by saying that the Soviet Union's ultimate aim is the totalitarian domination of the world, that past Russian actions prove it, and that anything the Russians do now is for the same purpose. Men and women in other countries, hundreds of millions of whom live most of their lives from day to day on the border of starvation, do not think very much of the past events, and they think still less of the future;

they live largely for today. Although Soviet action in Hungary may have brought revulsion to mankind, other Soviet actions have produced quite a different reaction. . . .

The fact is . . . and we had better face it—that regardless of attitudes towards communism's ultimate objective, many Soviet policies and actions have evoked a sympathetic response throughout the world. These flexible policies are not going to be ignored or labeled bad by other peoples, even if we choose to ignore them or to so label them. They are not going to be met by inflexibility and inertia on our part. . . .

New Ideas Needed

Many proposals which have been put forth by distinguished members of the Congress and by learned men outside the government might help break the logjam of this apathy, if the Administration has the will and determination to do it. . . .

There is little evidence that the Administration has welcomed the range of proposals put forth by members of this body. There is little evidence that the ideas and plans of distinguished journalists, leaders and students have struck a responsive chord in the State Department or the White House. There is little evidence that the men and women with provocative intelligence within the working levels of the Administration itself have been able to obtain adequate consideration of their suggestions at the restricted policy levels of the Administration. . . .

Indeed . . . the evidence is to the contrary. Our policies seem to be

formulated while we are en route to the fires. The Eisenhower Doctrine of last year, for example, was primarily a military response to a non-military threat. And, today, the Middle East tinderbox is as ready for the spark as ever.

Our aid programs this year embody little new thinking. . . .

There is little evidence that we have freshly weighed the economic and military threat to underdeveloped areas. If we manage to build up the defense forces of the countries we aid, and then lose those countries to Communist domination, because of inadequate attention to their economic needs, we will be worse off than if we had done nothing. . . .

There certainly is no evidence that the Administration has comprehended the dangers of reliance on the doctrine of mutual deterrence. Neither is there evidence that the Administration comprehends that the existence of the concept may afford new opportunities to stabilize peace.

The fact that, for the first time in history, great power competitors can destroy each other creates a mutuality of interest in self-survival. This mutuality of interest provides a power base for realistic, self-enforcing agreements.

It has often been said that the Soviet Union will not keep agreements unless they are self-enforcing—unless such agreements are, and continue to be, in the Soviet interest. If this be true—and I believe it is—it seems to me that recognition of the existence of mutual capacity to destroy each other provides the United States and the Soviet Union with a basis for agreements which might serve to reduce areas of contact which otherwise might generate the spark of war.

It is only as this nation proceeds diligently to explore these areas that it can expect to maintain the respect of mankind. This we have not done.

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Dulles

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lated areas. Now the productivity of our farmers produces surpluses which provide other free nations with the wherewithal to prevent vast starvation no longer tolerable by the standards to which the free world now adheres. Under Public Law 480, we have, since 1954, provided other nations with an aggregate of nearly \$3 billion worth of our agricultural products. . . .

New Competition

8. *The Economic Problem.* We do much to solve the economic problems of this changing world. . . . But economic problems still confront us.

If the Soviet Union decides to use its increasing industrial productivity primarily to serve the goals of international communism, we may face acute problems.

It now stands to gain too much from the adverse impact on certain countries, as of Latin America, of rapidly shifting free-world prices and fluctuating free-world markets.

There is another type of danger if the Soviet state engages in ruthless competition with private free-world concerns which, to survive, must make a profit.

Over a range of economic relations among the countries of the free world we shall need to seek out new initiatives to bring greater economic strength and unity. . . .

9. *Disarmament.* We are not content with a world where the potentials of destruction not only absorb vast economic effort but would, if unleashed, endanger all human life. So we strive for "disarmament," meaning measures of international inspection to diminish the danger of massive surprise attack and actual limitations or reductions of various types of armament. . . .

10. *Agreements with the Soviet*

Union. The United States does not exclude the possibility of achieving significant agreements with the Soviet Union in certain areas of mutual interest. Within the past five years we have made several agreements with the Communists, notably the agreement that ended the Korean hostilities and the agreement that liberated Austria. But:

We do *not* believe that the "cold war" can be ended by a formula of words, so long as the basic creed of international communism requires world rule.

We do *not* believe that we should alter our position merely in reliance of Soviet promises. These have too often proved undependable and have entrapped and even proved fatal to those who have relied thereon.

We *do* believe that the Soviet Union, like the United States, would like to reduce the economic burden of modern armaments. We also believe that the Soviet Union, under present conditions, does not want war. Therefore, some common ground exists. . . .

I have outlined some of the more important and constructive measures being taken by the United States, usually in cooperation with our allies, to assure that the challenge of change will be met by those who believe in a spiritual world, a world where nations are independent and where individuals are free.

I see a prospect that provides good ground for hope. We are not being tossed about rudderless on a sea of change. We are guiding and influencing the character of change, so that it shall be constructive.

I realize full well that our record is not perfect. We have no doubt done some things we should not have done, and not done all that we should have done. But we have moved positively and creatively to bring to the new worlds about us the basic values

which this nation was founded to preserve.

Fulbright

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Not only have we failed to press forward in a search for areas of agreement, but we have failed even to explore the proposals of others. . . .

While I am not prepared at this time to commit myself finally to such concepts as disengagement, the fact that proposals of this kind are put forth by such able, thoughtful and experienced men as George Kennan and Walter Lippmann suggests that, at a minimum, we owe it to ourselves to consider their ideas carefully and thoroughly.

The alternative to decreased tension is increased tension. The alternative to lessening tension between the Communist bloc and the free world is maintenance of the arms race, the continuation of nuclear testing, and the gradual exhaustion of such reservoirs of confidence in United States leadership as still exists throughout the world. . . .

The Congress is certainly not competent, by its own character and structure, to conduct the foreign relations of the nation. The Constitution imposes this responsibility upon the President of the United States. The Congress is competent, however, by its resolutions and laws, to inject energy into the executive branch when it is inert, to give it guidance when it is aimless. . . .

There is no law of God or man which assures the survival of any peoples if they do not have the wit and energy to survive. I hope that we shall be able to stimulate this Administration into accepting the responsibilities and challenges incumbent on the leadership of the United States in the mid-20th century so that we may have, as a people, a reasonable expectation of survival.



The World's Unfinished Business

BRUSSELS—While great nations and small struggle in the United Nations with some of the fundamental political problems of our times—here, in an atmosphere of gaiety and relaxation, millions of people from all corners of the globe are crowding in to see an exposition whose theme is a new humanism in a scientific age.

The urgent need to stress this theme is evident as one goes from pavilion to pavilion, from the bright and airy structure fronting on sparkling fountains erected by the United States to the massive, severe Russian building dominated by a statue of Lenin and Communist slogans inscribed on the walls. All the industrial nations, irrespective of ideology, accent the importance and promise of technology, and particularly of atomic energy for peaceful uses.

On all sides are models of the most advanced machines, airplanes, earth satellites, isotopes for medical purposes, automobiles or harvesters. The United States, whose industrial pre-eminence is not questioned, underplays this emphasis; the U.S.S.R., which only yesterday was regarded by the West as a country of unskilled peasants and still feels the need to prove its achievements, overplays it. But all nations capable of manufacturing machinery convey the message, well understood by the underdeveloped peoples, that in the atomic age mastery of modern techniques is essential for internal prosperity and internal security.

In viewing the many technical exhibits, one cannot help wondering what will happen when all peoples, the now backward as well as the now advanced, will be able to produce ball bearings, airplanes, isotopes and—

conceivably—hydrogen bombs. What, then, will be the goals of international competition?

The optimistic spirit generated by the Brussels Fair makes one hope that when universal command of technology has narrowed the gap, which now exists between rich lands and poor, between the West and the non-West, then all peoples will have the time and the desire to vie with each other in nontechnical achievements, to cultivate a new humanism. Then all peoples—not only the Atlantic democracies, which have enjoyed the advantages of early industrialization—will be confronted with what the French writer, Paul Valéry, has called “the frightening responsibility of human liberty.”

The Challenge

How will they respond to the need of maintaining, adapting and, it must be hoped, expanding the rights of man in an age whose technical discoveries often seem to demand more conformity, greater acceptance of regulation, less free thinking and criticism by the individual?

The new humanism is the world's unfinished business and those who planned the United States exhibit at the fair were sensitively aware of the contribution Americans could make on this score. For in our pavilion they arranged an exhibit called “Unfinished Work,” portraying three problems—race relations, urban renewal and conservation of natural resources. Yet early in August this exhibit, which had made a deep impression on visitors from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, as well as on many American visitors, was removed and replaced by a public

health exhibit. This change was reportedly made because of the recommendations of some members of Congress, the State Department and the United States Information Agency.

In the first part of “Unfinished Work” the problems were simply stated as follows: “1. ‘The American Negro.’ One American citizen in ten is descended from African slaves. These 17 million Negroes have yet to win all of the equal rights promised them by American democratic theory. 2. ‘The Alliance with Nature.’ The American continent was settled with little thought for the future of its seemingly unlimited resources . . . now nature needs help from man's management to husband and renew trees, soil and water; 3. ‘The Crowded City.’ In less than two generations, Americans have changed from a country to a city people. Three-fourths of them now live in urban areas, whose rapid growth has brought problems of conglomeration and of housing that is not yet up to the other standards of American life.”

Young men and women drawn from all parts of the United States, acting as guides, explained this exhibit to visitors, admitting that many aspects of the present situation are unfortunate, but pointing out that recent changes justify optimism. The final section of the exhibit contained a plaque that read: “American communities, like American individuals, like to emulate and surpass each other. By this process democracy's unfinished business, already partially mastered, will get done on a national scale. To be followed no doubt by other (and perhaps nobler) chal-

lenges. The goal that draws us is not Utopia, but larger freedom, with more justice. Democracy is our method. Slowly but surely it works."

This exhibit drew praise even from visitors who had come prepared to condemn the United States for its treatment of its Negro citizens. Some said, "You are very courageous to do this," or "Only a great country can recognize its own faults." Yet the exhibit which represented a significant challenge to the claim, trumpeted by the U.S.S.R. from the walls of its pavilion, that communism has the final answers to all human problems, was withdrawn because of the fears or reticences of a few Americans.

"Unfinished Work" did a good job of communicating the humanism of the American nation. It expressed well the theme of the entire exposition—that the uses of technology must ultimately be human uses. The common denominator of man's efforts, in other words, must be man himself. No one could come away from this exposition without a sense of awareness that man, for all his diversities, is a common cause. Or, to put it in a lighter vein, as a commentator did in the Brussels newspaper, *Le Soir*, "The most evident resemblance between the diverse populations which crowd our globe, between groups of all ages and all social classes, is love of ice cream.

Black, red, yellow and white, children and grandparents, officers and soldiers, sailors and aviators, priests and nuns, all love it, lick it and savor it. If the great powers seek a common ground for understanding in a summit conference, bring them ice cream. It will melt."

One is also left with a challenging thought: in the international competition of the future, what nation will assume the responsibility of leadership in nurturing a humanism which admits that no one people has a monopoly of virtue—or ever will?

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Bookshelf

NOVELS AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The daughter of Madam Pandit, Nayan-tara Sahgal, in her novel, *A Time To Be Happy* (New York, Knopf, 1958, \$3.95) tells of the effect of the radical changes taking place in India on upper-class Indians, many of whom were educated in England and have become very Westernized. It is human, convincing and charmingly written.

Life in India, from a completely different point of view, comes vividly to life in R. K. Narayan's latest novel, *The Guide* (New York, Viking, 1958, \$3.50), in which he tells the story of a beguiling rogue who makes the best use of his talents even in jail, and eventually becomes a "reluctant" but successful "holy man."

Moolitiki: Stories and Poems from India, by Rumer Godden (New York, Viking, 1957, \$3.50), is a delightful book of poems and short stories of India by an English author who was brought up in India and has a sympathetic understanding of the country and its people.

In *Hamilton Avenue* (New York, Macmillan, 1958, \$3.75), Ronald Byron vividly portrays the lives of the African people among whom he works as a medical practitioner in Johannesburg, South Africa, in his first novel which describes the impact of the white man's industrial world on the

negroes' own uncomplicated primitive existence.

Another part of Africa comes alive in *African Tapestry* (London, Faber and Faber, 1958, 21s.), when Mrs. Margaret Trowell describes her life in Uganda and her work at the University College of East Africa, where she established a School of Art and taught the Africans to express themselves in an unfamiliar medium.

Jørgen Andersen-Rosendal, a Danish journalist who lost his heart to oriental women, has written a group of "fairy tales" about some of the women he met during the many years he spent in Asia. *The Moon of Beauty* (New York, Day, 1958, \$3.95) will win many hearts too. It is translated from the Danish by Eiler Hansen and J. F. Burke.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Basic Documents in United States Foreign Policy, by Thomas P. Brockway, dean of Bennington College (Princeton, N.J., Van Nostrand, 1957, \$1.25). A handy paperback containing the texts of 82 documents from the Declaration of Independence to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Information Please Almanac 1958 (New York, Macmillan, 1957, \$1.25 paperbound, \$2.50 clothbound), is also a very useful reference book, containing sections on current events and world history as well as a mass of material on the United States.

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MR. PAUL MANLEY
17917 SCHENELY AVE.
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

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